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The thirtieth anniversary of the signature of the Australia–Japan Basic Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation in 2006 offered an opportunity to review the
significance of this event for Australia–Japan relations. The Australia–Japan
Research Centre at The Australian National University took the advantage of an
approach from the Australian Institute of International Affairs to organise a joint
conference for this purpose, bringing together experts on Australia–Japan relations
and practitioners from the government and non-government sectors who had
been involved, directly and indirectly, in the negotiation of the treaty or in tints
implementation. While some accounts of the treaty negotiation had already been
published1, more was to be said, both about the inside story of this process as well
as the broader historical importance of the treaty for Australia and Japan.
A special issue of the Australian Journal of International Affairs in December
2006 published the main papers presented at the ANU conference.2 This volume
contains papers based on some of the other presentations at the conference that
were not able to be included in the AJIA special issue.
Garry Woodard was the leader of the Australian negotiating team that
completed the task of concluding the negotiations. Retiring from his career as an
Australian diplomat in 1986 after serving as Australian Ambassador in Beijing,
Garry has written extensively about Australian foreign policy at the University of
Melbourne, reflecting from his lengthy experience on some of the underlying
issues in his writings. Here he provides for the first time a rather personal
recollection of the political and other forces that affected his task, positively and
negatively.
Max Suich approaches this subject from the perspective of a journalist, an
outsider who was nevertheless an extremely close observer of the events leading
up to, and after, the signature of the treaty. Based on his own analyses of the times,
as well as his own extensive contacts with many of the key players in Australia–
Japan relations, inside and outside the government, Max offers some salutary
thoughts on what happened, and on what might have happened. Why were
officials on both sides so cautious when other important stakeholders, such as the
business community, were prepared to have a more trusting relationship?, he asks.
Moreen Dee is a professional historian working in the Department of Foreign
Affairs who has a second-to-none knowledge of the main Australian archives of
the treaty negotiations, but who claims no special expertise on Australian–
Japanese relations. Her official monograph was published by the Australianv
Government as ‘Friendship and cooperation: the 1976 Basic Treaty between
Australia and Japan’ to mark the thirtieth anniversary. Interpreting some of the
tensions and pressures that faced the Australian decision-makers, Moreen’s
present paper provides insights that did not make it into the official account. Yet,
Moreen reminds us, there is even more to be told if the archives from the Treasury
and Immigration Departments were to be explored.
So far, nobody has investigated the Japanese archives of this period to provide
a counterbalancing Japanese version of the process. In these days, when there are
fewer ‘secrets’ than ever between Australia and Japan, and when we are keen to
acknowledge and understand the contributions that those working before us have
made, this is surely the next challenge for adventurous researchers. To what
extent, if any, does the thinking that informed Japanese policy in the 1970s still
influence Japanese attitudes towards Australia today?
Views will differ on the real significance of the Basic Treaty itself. In some
senses, once it was achieved, it was already ‘time to move on’; its significance was
deeply symbolic for Japan because it overcame their deep-seated and long-
standing perceptions of discrimination in Australian policies. And ‘move on’
Australia–Japan relations certainly did. Since 1976, levels of intimacy and
mutuality of interests have been reached that could never have been imagined
thirty years ago: that Australia and Japan would be working as security partners
with their military forces alongside one another in Iraq and elsewhere; that
Japanese and Australian artists would be cooperating as fellow professionals on an
every-day basis in theatres, orchestras, and galleries around both countries with
the minimum of cultural or other barriers; and that young and old Australians and
Japanese would be living alongside one another in each other’s countries as
business people, students, retirees, for example. But above all there is the
extremely successful business and commercial relationship reflected in the





1 Principally those by Arthur Stockwin in his ‘Negotiating the basic treaty between Australia
and Japan, 1973–76’ in Japanese Studies, 24(2): 201–14, 2004, and Garry Woodard in his
‘The Australia–Japan treaty of friendship and cooperation: An Australian perspective’ in
Pacific Economic Paper, No. 172, Australia–Japan Research Centre, 1989.
2 This appeared as Australian Journal of International Affairs, Volume 60, Number 4,
December 2007.This project’s concern for diplomatic history is admirable, and my remarks will be directed
towards encouraging the cause.
Despite the best efforts of the Historical Documents Section of the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), diplomatic history is languishing in Australian universi-
ties, as elsewhere, As evidence, I cite the under-whelming reception of Peter Edwards’ fine
biography of Arthur Tange1 and academia’s muted notice of the 30th anniversary of the end
of the Vietnam war and the 40th anniversary of Australia’s involvement, despite, I argue, their
contemporary relevance.
Apologia
I regret that I can make only a meagre contribution to this topic, because of the order of my
role in only the last stages of the negotiation of the Australia–Japan Basic Treaty. I offer these
comments only because those principally involved, Michael Cook and Ashton Calvert, cannot
do so.
I have not thought about the treaty for many years. In 1989, I had provided ‘an
Australian perspective’ of the treaty in the Australia–Japan Research Centre’s Pacific
Economic Papers.2 That was done for a few reasons. I had some continuing direct association
with the bilateral relationship as a member of the board of the Australia–Japan Foundation.
The second invoking of the treaty, both by Australia, had just occurred, in somewhat
equivocal circumstances, but it rekindled my hopes that life could be breathed into it as an
umbrella for the development of bilateral relations, as envisaged especially in the Preamble
and early Articles, and in Art. XI. I was entitled to access to DFAT documents outside the
30-year rule and saw this privilege as an obligation to contribute to the store of knowledge.
In the event, I could not find our working set of half-a-dozen files, which have probably turned
up since. This could not aim at a comprehensive account, as access to the files of the other
Australian departments involved in the negotiations was not possible and DFAT approval for
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comments in this area could not reasonably be expected. Moreen Dee has also confined
herself to the DFAT files in her valuable historical study (hereinafter referred to as the Dee
paper, references being to the first draft3).
Bureaucratic politics
Therefore an interesting area for further research by students of Australian public policy and
bureaucratic politics is the web of inter-departmental relations, at a time when departmental
disputation was common and Prime Minister Gough Whitlam encouraged ‘creative tension’.
The files are now available under the 30-year rule. An encouraging number of the actors are
still in rude health, witness Stuart Harris, and amongst DFA negotiators those beginning with
David Anderson, although this may not be true of Immigration. A useful starting point is the
Coombs Commission, the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration,
especially TV Matthews’ paper about the government’s inter-departmental committee on
Japan4. Just as on the Australian side, interesting differences appear to have existed between
Japanese departments on both negotiating tactics5 and substance6.
National interests and negotiating style
In addition to bureaucratic politics, there is room for cooperative research projects with
Japanese academics, offering the prospect of attracting grants, about respective national
aspirations and different negotiating styles (now a popular field in academia and think-tanks).
I regret that Arthur Stockwin’s cooperative research study of the negotiations, which I sought
to facilitate in luring him to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) as academic in
residence, apparently did not result in a book. It was well advanced when I wrote my pamphlet
and we were in contact.7
I also regret that the department did not do a retrospective study of what we learnt from
the negotiations. To its credit, the Australian Embassy in Beijing did this about Chinese
negotiating style in respect of the consular treaty between Australia and China, which it was
my first official task there to sign. It would have been difficult in the case of the Nara Treaty
because of discontinuities in the DFA negotiating team and the demands placed on officials
involved in it by Malcolm Fraser’s visits to Tokyo and Beijing.
I chanced my arm about Japanese negotiating style in the first version of my AJRC
paper. It was a silly thing to do without closely consulting all the Australians who had
negotiated with the Japanese over three years and having access to Japanese negotiators and
documentation. Criticism came from all sides, including by two easily identifiable anonymous
reviewers and withdrew speedily from the field. The opportunity for a serious study still exists.                                                                                           GARRY WOODARD   3
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Political relationships
I carried back to Canberra from the hermit state of Burma in February 1975 a favourable
perception of Australia’s Asia policies and Whitlam’s standing. In my AJRC paper, I took an
optimistic and perhaps audacious view of the relevance in the treaty context of Australia’s fast-
developing status as a regional power. That appealed to Whitlam, who wrote, with surprising
and misplaced generosity about his immediate predecessors, that:
You make the very interesting point – which I do not remember having seen stated before –
that in the late 60s and early 70s Australia was in a singular position of equality with Japan,
at least in the view of the Japanese. This is a new insight. Yet it confirms my basic view of political
action in history: the timing is all.8
We need more evidence about whether and how Whitlam’s foreign policy entered in
to the calculations of the Japanese negotiators. We can say that Japan welcomed Whitlam’s
regional emphasis, but viewed it through a mercantilist prism. In particular, Britain’s entry
into the EEC on 1 January 1973 accelerated Japanese hopes for closer economic and financial
ties. Independence from Britain was good; independence from the United States was not.
Certainly we sorely tried Japan by entering into diplomatic relations with North Korea, about
which I knew something, as I was to have been non-resident Ambassador in Pyongyang.
Other Asian issues like an Indian Ocean nuclear free zone and aid for a united Vietnam, where
we annoyed Henry Kissinger and Lee Kuan Yew, must also have been irritants to Japan.
Resources policies
The negotiations were certainly directly impacted by one area of Labor’s international and
domestic policies, emphasising ownership and control of resources, which were of course
central to the treaty’s aim of assuring Japan that Australia would be a reliable supplier of raw
materials. The Japanese were exposed early to the uncompromising convictions and
personalities of the Minister for Minerals and Energy, Rex Connor, and the secretary of his
department, Lenox Hewitt, in a marathon communiqué-drafting session at the end of the
Australia–Japan Ministerial Committee meeting in Tokyo in October 1973.9 In his
autobiography John Menadue writes:
Connor was from Wollongong, an Australian nationalist par excellence, suspicious of
foreigners and with a great love of the mining industry (sic: Connor described its titans as ‘mugs
and hillbillies’10). He spoke about coal with knowledge and passion. A great resource was being
plundered by the Japanese.114   THE STATE OF DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
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Saburo Okita told me in 1976 that some years earlier he had been tasked by the Japanese
Prime Minister to prepare a study of all the means available to Japan to secure supply of vital
resources. When asked whether that included military means, he said ‘yes’. Of course, Japan
adopted a much more subtle and successful policy of creating world over-supply, and was
advantageously placed on both sides of the negotiating table by their trading companies’
equity in Australian mines. Therefore Japan insisted that trade and financial flows were
commercial matters in which governments should not intervene (which has a contemporary
ring, although now the Australian government accepts 100 per cent foreign ownership of
resources). In contrast to Rex Connor, for whom a contract was a bond, the Japanese did
not put all their trust in scraps of paper, especially official.
Personalities
Mention of Okita requires recalling his close friend and collaborator, Sir John Crawford and
the reassurance to governments each of them, and they together, provided. These were men
with unusually long histories, and with long perspectives, which bureaucracy lacks. Without
them, we wouldn’t have had the treaty.
It must so have been important that, ‘despite the vicissitudes’, in Peter Drysdale’s
mighty phrase, the conduct of relations was in the hands of two outstanding Ambassadors:
K.C.O. (Mick) Shann had notable gifts, not least in getting a large Australian Embassy to
work as a team; Yoshio Okawara also had great personal gifts, and the advantage of Eric
Walsh’s insights.12 Both Shann’s and Okawara’s inter-personal skills were later used in the
private sector.
The final year of treaty talks: (I) Whitlam
When I took up duty in March 1975 as head of the Executive Secretariat responsible for policy
planning and servicing the secretary of DFA, Alan Renouf, and, very quickly, for chairing
inter-departmental crisis task forces, an innovation which lasted, I was vaguely aware that the
negotiations on the Australia–Japan treaty had reached a crisis point. I knew that Renouf had
secured by phone from Whitlam approval to tell the Japanese through Okawara that it would
be better to have no treaty than to have a bad one.
However, I did not follow developments over the next four months, during which Cook
visited Tokyo, and the Embassy was given a last resort mandate to engage in quiet talks to
see whether there was any point in continuing to negotiate. When I came cold into the treaty
negotiations on succeeding Cook in July, the Embassy through Ashton Calvert had in fact
achieved a breakthrough, but it had not been sold to Canberra departments.                                                                                           GARRY WOODARD   5
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From the beginning, I saw advantages in a broad umbrella treaty, and continue to do
so. I considered a mutual affirmation of friendship desirable, ‘from enmity to alliance’. I
thought it particularly significant that the treaty would include provisions on the two issues
which in a long historical perspective had soured the bilateral relationship and contributed to
Japan’s aggression through exploitation by ultra-rightists, racial discrimination and cutting off
of resources. Whatever one’s interpretation of history, we have the testimony of John
Menadue’s stewardship as Ambassador to Japan from 1977–80 that these issues continued
to be at the front of Japanese perceptions of Australia (Menadue 1999).
By July 1975 the Japanese had reluctantly given up their aim of a standard commerce
and navigation treaty, or something as near to it as possible and for most favoured nation
(MFN) treatment having retrospective and prospective application, an interpretation which
we had seen as a provocation. Their alternative proposal of a standard of treatment which was
‘fair and equitable’ and non-discriminatory was a radical concession, advanced to break out
of the protracted and bitter deadlock over what constituted MFN treatment. It provided the
basis for further mutual clarifications agreed between Ashton Calvert and his Gaimusho
counterpart, in which Japan agreed to accept the Australian interpretation of MFN as the most
it could hope to get, without prejudice to its many FCN Treaties. (Ashton Calvert returned
to Canberra late in the year to become an invaluable part of the negotiation team.) ‘Fair and
equitable’ treatment, proposed by Japan, seemed in the circumstances of an umbrella treaty
to have a positive ring to it.
The most useful area for me to contribute to the common store of knowledge is
bureaucratic politics. When the second Japanese negotiator, Masatada Tachibana13, made a
useful visit to Canberra, ostensibly for other purposes, in September 1975, he likened the
stage of the negotiations to reaching the ninth and most arduous point in the ascent of Mt
Fuji, but for some of the Australian negotiating team a more apt simile was the Stations of
the Cross. The ascent had become too arduous and the summit seemed remote.
I should say at the outset that, despite the differences, which had not just been between
DFA and the rest, but had been waged on a broad internecine front, especially until Japan
gave up asking for MFN treatment, the atmosphere within the negotiating team remained
collegiate, though it was sometimes the comfort of a lost herd on a darkling plain.
The culture of Immigration was the most intriguing. Earlier in the negotiations it had
advocated reciprocity.14 While DFA apparently was not inclined to treat this as a serious
proposition, justifiably or not, it was a point of view I had to deal with in June 1976 when I
briefed Australian journalists in Tokyo, who had limited duration visas. By mid–1975 the
Department’s primary stated objection was that it feared the treaty could be invoked in
individual cases, and it insisted on a precise standard of treatment in which ‘fair and equitable’
was defined as non-discriminatory. Whitlam told me he had sent Peter Wilenski to be secretary6   THE STATE OF DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
Asia Pacific Economic Papers
of Immigration to reform the culture, but ‘Rome (or perhaps rather Sparta) was not built in
a day’. The problem must have been exacerbated by the personal differences between
Whitlam and the Immigration Minister Clyde Cameron, but Jim McLelland, who succeeded
him, also backed his officials. Whitlam told me he would talk to McLelland, but the treaty hung
fire while more pressing matters preoccupied him. It would not have helped that the portfolio
covered both Labour and Immigration. The trade union movement did not favour Japanese
immigration.
Except for DFA and the Department of the Prime Minister & Cabinet (PM&C) all the
other departments involved, fearful of Japan (or anyone) being able to pry into their decision-
making, leant in varying degree towards Immigration’s view that there was a need for the
standard treatment to be precisely defined. Thus, officials could not unite on an agreed
recommendation to Cabinet to conclude the treaty. I felt confident a meeting of Cabinet
would agree that in the interests of bilateral relations the treaty should be concluded, even if
that were made subject to a further round of negotiations. I thought it far more likely that
Whitlam would get his way and avoid that pre-condition. He would have been loyally backed
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Don Willesee, who told his colleagues ‘fair and equitable’
meant offering Japan ‘a fair go’ (although Willesee was so disenchanted, generally, that he
considered resigning in early November15).
Whitlam’s disappointment that the treaty was not completed on his watch is well-
known, and natural. I should record that though there were pressures from those around him
to ‘crash through’ there was none from him.
(2) Fraser
My assumption that Malcolm Fraser, with whom I had worked when he was Minister for
Defence, would proceed with the treaty was confirmed in a conversation Renouf had with him
on my advice in mid-December 1975. Fraser asked for a Cabinet submission by 20 January.
Also Fraser’s Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock indicated early that there would be a
bipartisan approach to China. This was tricky within the Liberal Party, and so a counter-
balancing success with Japan was highly desirable. Peacock was not so unequivocally for the
treaty as his leader, presumably fearing a rough passage in Cabinet, but his only requirement
was to be reassured that there was no chance of the term ‘NARA’, which was identified with
Whitlam and his closest advisers, Graham Freudenberg and Jim Spigelman, being used. I gave
him this in good faith, knowing it was the Gaimusho’s wish, and not foreseeing that ‘NARA’
would stubbornly survive to this day.
There then came a surprising objection from Treasury, which in the end redounded
against the treaty sceptics. It signalled that it thought it could scupper the treaty in a letter sent                                                                                           GARRY WOODARD   7
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to the negotiating departments the day before they were to meet to prepare the Cabinet
submission. It marked a volte-face from its position in October that the treaty could be
proceeded with although there would be no harm in a further round of negotiations if
Immigration insisted. Treasury noted there had been difficulties in the areas of international
economic relations and taxation and it now wished to reopen these areas, because Japanese
negotiating tactics had been dubious and needed scrutiny. In the areas of foreign capital and
foreign investment it now claimed difficulties were unresolved. It expressed doubt that the
government on proper consideration would wish to reverse its earlier opposition to a treaty.
It recommended that the treaty be put on one side while more urgent matters were addressed.
Treasury’s attempt to establish itself as the guardian of conservative orthodoxy did not sit well
with other departments, and they had no stomach for going back to square one. A Submission
to Cabinet to proceed with the treaty was agreed and accepted by Fraser, who circulated it
for Cabinet consideration.
Treasury then tried another ploy, its Minister suggesting to his colleagues that Cabinet
consideration should be deferred until after Trade Minister Doug Anthony had visited Japan
in the first fortnight of February 1976. This collapsed when Anthony refused to play. Fraser’s
disposition to proceed brooked no opposition. Nevertheless, Peacock did not anticipate an
easy passage in Cabinet and I had to give him an expansive brief and suffered cross-
examination on it before he delivered it in extenso. Ministers did not want to delve into the
interstices of the treaty, but Country Party ministers were inclined to argue that in tidying up
and signing it the government should try to secure tangible reciprocal benefits.
The tidying up of the treaty involved many more protracted inter-departmental
meetings. While it might have seemed impossible for any department to come up with a new
wrinkle, one demanded reassurance that the treaty would not require Japanese companies
incorporated in Japan or seeking entry to be treated the same as Japanese companies
incorporated in or already operating in Australia. I recollect that at the end of a highly circular
and prolonged discussion, which went on through lunch, DFA’s urbane British Legal Adviser,
Eli Lauterpacht, defined ‘fair and equitable’ as no more than a general standard, and
illustrated it by quaintly saying that if a young man had two girlfriends and treated both nicely
neither could complain if one was taken to the pictures and the other given a box of chocolates.
On the conduct of negotiations and exchanges, there is little to add to Moreen Dee’s
paper. As it states, there was still enough uncertainty, notably in Immigration’s area, for
Fraser to agree that negotiations should not be approached as having to meet a deadline (set
at 30 April if Fraser was to sign the treaty during his planned visit to Japan and China in June).
Ashton Calvert went to Tokyo in April to resolve Japanese difficulties on legal interpretation,
especially of MFN, and related to possible interpretation by the Japanese Diet (parliament).
He and I had an arrangement that if the Japanese sought to go back on any point already8   THE STATE OF DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
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agreed he would report to me on an open telephone line and I would then instruct him to
return to Canberra. This did indeed happen, and the next morning the Japanese resiled on
the point. The Treaty received a final ‘chop’ in discussions in Canberra in May and was signed
in June between Fraser and, serendipitously, Takeo Miki, who as Foreign Minister had shared
with Whitlam a vision of Japanese–Australian cooperation.16 The treaty was the centrepiece
and highlight of Fraser’s visit to Tokyo, the first leg of his first major overseas visit, for which
he chose north Asia.
Finally, I want to say something about Tachibana, the leader of the Japanese negotiating
team in the final stages. If ever a foreigner deserved an AO, it was Tachibana, but instead he
is an evanescent presence in the story of Australia–Japan relations. I only wish I had the talents
of J.M. Keynes to describe Tachibana and his key role as Keynes did his opposite number at
the post-World War I Conference, Dr Melchior. The two men and their respective situations
were nothing alike. But Tachibana, like Melchior, was willing to abandon formality and to
converse privately, making breakthroughs possible. He did this despite the Damocles sword
over his head of having to appear before the Diet to justify every word of the treaty. Melchior
had to run the gauntlet of being a Jew amongst a delegation of unrepentant Germans, on
whom Keynes makes the politically incorrect comment that:
they satisfied wonderfully, as a group, the popular conception of Huns. The personal
appearance of that race is really extraordinarily against them. Who knows but that it was the
real cause of the war.17
Tachibana could see the wood and was not caught in the trees. His diplomatic skills were
of the highest order, and given lustre by a capacity for great warmth. After the signing of the
treaty and the formal celebrations, he took me out for a long dinner, near the end of which
he described his war in Manchuria, and how at the surrender he had been unable to go through
with committing hara-kiri. By curious coincidence, the Counsellor at the Japanese Embassy
had told me how he had second thoughts when assigned to the last kamikaze flight out of
Japan. I slept only briefly before joining Malcolm Fraser’s breakfast delegation meeting where
I found, embarrassingly, that I was the only one to have slept through a severe earth tremor.
Sic transit memoris.
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2  THE NEGOTIATION OF THE 1976 BASIC TREATY OF
FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN AUSTRALIA
AND JAPAN: A STUDY OF THE DOCUMENTS
MOREEN DEE*
The 1976 Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Australia and Japan
is the formal representation of the importance both countries place on their bilateral
relationship. A study of the documents relating to its negotiation from 1973 to 1976
show that this was a complex, often strained, process. One that was driven by political
will of the Australian and Japanese leadership and brought to a successful conclusion
through the commitment of the their bureaucracies to overcoming the respective
difficulties and finding the means to accommodate each other’s position.
Introduction
The signing of the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Australia and Japan
on 16 June 1976 was a significant event in the history of Australian foreign policy-making.
The treaty was the first comprehensive treaty Australia negotiated with another country and
to this day, it remains the only one. Its negotiation was a complex undertaking for both
countries. While Japan had similar treaties of commerce and navigation with twenty-six other
countries,1 the Basic Treaty was broader in its scope and purpose than any of these, including
the considerable treaties negotiated with the United States and Britain. So for both countries
the experience of negotiating this treaty entered new territory. At the time the process
attracted considerable political, academic and press attention and speculation, but it is only
now—30 years after the event—that the complete set of government files on the treaty’s
negotiation are available. This paper considers this documentary evidence to determine the
manner in which Australian and Japanese officials worked together to overcome their
respective difficulties and find the means to accommodate each other’s position in the drafting
of the treaty.MOREEN DEE   11
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Background
The significance of the Basic Treaty is that it provides assurances that a high standard of
treatment afforded the other country will not be changed and that there will be no
discrimination against either party. An overarching description is that it enshrines in formal
and symbolic terms the friendship, community of interests and interdependence that exist
between Australia and Japan. It establishes a broad framework for further Cooperation,
including the negotiation of new agreements, in specific areas. And it recognises the two
countries’ mutual interest in each being a stable and reliable supplier to and market for the
other and it prescribes, on a mutual basis, specific standards of treatment to be accorded to
nationals and companies as regards their entry and stay and business and professional
activities.
Australia’s relationship with Japan is its longest standing bilateral relationship in the
Asia–Pacific region. The conclusion of the 1957 Commerce Agreement underwrote a
dramatic growth in trade and economic integration between the two countries but, by the
1970s, political leaders in Canberra and Tokyo recognised that there was a need to extend
and strengthen Australia–Japan relations and place them ‘on an even closer and more
concrete basis’.2
For Japan, this was simply a matter of concluding its preferred method of gaining formal
assurances of its rights as an economic partner—a treaty of friendship, commerce and
navigation (an FCN).3 In fact, Japan had first raised the question of such a treaty post-war
in 1955, and hints that Japan was again looking to approach Australia on the issue began to
appear in 1969.4 These hints became more frequent through 1970 to 1972 when Japanese
officials talked of completing ‘the chain of friendly agreements’ already existing between
Australia and Japan.5
Australia, on the other hand, did not favour such treaties, preferring that its trade and
commerce matters be facilitated through multilateral agreements and that specific issues be
dealt with in bilateral treaty arrangements. A practical reason for this was the difficulties arising
from the division in Commonwealth-State powers in the Australian federal system that made
it difficult to reconcile domestic legislation and treaty obligations. At the time, recent
experience of these difficulties in unsuccessfully trying to negotiate a similar treaty with the
United States only served to confirm bureaucratic disinclination to reverse this position.6 The
challenge was to find a manageable alternative means to respond positively to the current
Japanese approaches.12   THE NEGOTIATION OF THE 1976 BASIC TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION
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The documents
Overall, in looking at how this quest was approached, the documents clearly show three things
about the process that followed. The first is that there was no opposition from any quarter
in Canberra to having an overarching treaty with Japan in principle—indeed it was fully
accepted that such a treaty would be a positive expression of the strength of Australia–Japan
relations.
The second is that the entire process from its initiation to conclusion was driven
inexorably by political will—first by Prime Minister Gough Whitlam and then, without the
slightest slackening of purpose, by his successor, Malcolm Fraser.
And third—and the matter of most concern to this paper—is that the mechanics of
negotiating a treaty that could cut across a whole range of established policies, such as
immigration, trade, national development, banking legislation—even without the difficulties
of Commonwealth–State relations—presented an extremely difficult challenge for the
Australian bureaucracy. The fourteen or so departments that would be involved in drawing
up the treaty believed that a treaty was a good idea but from whatever way they looked at it,
the disadvantages still seemed to outweigh the advantages.7
Tasked with the practicalities of the negotiating process, the Department of Foreign
Affairs’ reluctance to proceed was understandably based on concerns arising out of the
experience of trying to gain bureaucratic consensus during the unsuccessful Australia–US
treaty attempt in 1970.8 Compounding the problem for both Australian and Japanese
bureaucracies was that in announcing that a treaty would be concluded, Prime Ministers
Whitlam and Tanaka simply entered into a political commitment that there would be a treaty.
There was never any indication given of the specific type of treaty envisaged.9
The documents show that, from the treaty’s gestation period 1972–1973 to its signing
in mid-1976, the process is a fascinating, at times dramatic, tale of on-again-off-again
negotiations, legalistic nit-picking, querulous semantic arguments, and frustration, even
suspicion, each of the other side—underscored by domestic turf protecting and interdepart-
mental wrangling.
The complex details of the various drafts, the counter-drafts, the attendant interdepart-
mental meetings, the consultative talks and the formal negotiations are beyond the scope of
this paper.10 The aim here is to provide overview of the documented account of the events
leading up to and during the negotiation process in the hope that this will lead to an
understanding of the political importance of this treaty to both countries.MOREEN DEE   13
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Deciding on a treaty
The treaty is generally, and deservedly, described as a ‘Whitlam initiative’, but in 1972 Prime
Minister William McMahon also looked to respond positively on the renewed Japanese
approaches. In fact, and as Whitlam would later do, he asked for a rethink when the first advice
he received was in the negative. However, he did not pursue the matter when, unable to
overcome strong opposition from the Department of Trade and Industry, he failed in his
second attempt to gain ministerial support.11
When Whitlam came to office in December 1972, the question of a possible Australia–
Japan treaty was one of the first matters he asked to be considered, although he did not indicate
a strong preference for or against the idea.12 In subsequent months, however, he became fixed
on the matter, rejecting, as mentioned, the first report recommending against a treaty as
‘appalling’ and going outside the bureaucracy to enlist the support of the noted economist,
Sir John Crawford.13 Once gained,14 Whitlam did not simply ask for a rethink, he demanded
a positive response and asked that a draft treaty to be ready for passing to the Japanese within
a month of his visit to Japan to attend the Australia–Japan Ministerial Meeting (as Minister
for Foreign Affairs) in late October 1973.15 His plan was to indicate Australia’s willingness
to negotiate a treaty to the Japanese at the talks and to take the opportunity of a meeting with
Prime Minister Tanaka to gain his support for the endeavour.16
Drafting a treaty
With Foreign Affairs in the co-ordinating role, the bureaucracy met the challenge and the first
Australian draft was passed to the Japanese on 14 December. It was for ‘broad-ranging Treaty
of Friendship and Cooperation’—an umbrella treaty—one that encompassed the operation
of established agreements and, at the same, covered the negotiation of new specific
agreements or the renegotiation of established agreements. That is, the drafters looked to
draw up a new form of treaty that combined assurances about reliability of supply and market
access with some of the elements of a traditional FCN treaty. But they extended it to cover
generalised proposals for political, cultural and social understanding and cooperation.17
But what we had now was an Australian concept of a broad, general agreement going
up against Japan’s notion of a concrete treaty, tied to economic benefits. The guideline that
Australian drafters had decided to adopt was that, ‘provided that it is carefully and precisely
drafted, the treaty would afford mutual advantages by taking account of mutual interests’.18
That is, a treaty that would stand on its own and offer advantages in its terms to both parties.14   THE NEGOTIATION OF THE 1976 BASIC TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION
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The Japanese-preferred FCN treaties, however, sought to ‘afford mutual advantages
by taking account of mutual privileges’.19 Herein would lie the rub. The long wait until the
following May for Japan’s counter-draft was only the beginning of what would be eighteen
months of protracted, often tense and difficult, talks and negotiations that would eventually
break down over differing interpretations of most favoured nation treatment as it applied to
investment, entry and stay and treatment of nationals and companies.
The documents show that the long months of difficult talks and formal negotiations that
would follow only served to confirm all the problems that the departments had foreseen,
particularly Trade, Minerals and Energy, Immigration, Transport, Taxation and Treasury.
That being said, there is nothing on the files that suggests any department sought to sabotage
the process. There was a firm commitment on all sides to reaching a settlement on a treaty.
The problems arose because this commitment was also seen as ensuring that the treaty
contained all the requirements that served the interests of each individual department. The
Japanese record is as yet unavailable but reports from the Australian embassy in Tokyo
indicate that officers of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Gaimusho, were having
the same difficulties with the other bureaus of the Japanese bureaucracy in reaching
agreement on particular requirements in their drafts.20
 The first negotiating phase
Although both delegations came to the negotiating table against this background of internal
turf protecting, the substantial progress made at the first formal negotiation round 28
November to 4 December in Tokyo saw both delegations feeling that the next round set down
for late January 1975 in Canberra could well result in the initialling of a treaty.21 This outcome
had been facilitated by rounds of talks, first in Tokyo in July 1974 and then in Canberra in
early October, that allowed Australian and Japanese officials to gain a better understanding
of each other’s position as they worked on their progressive drafts.
But the second round of negotiations did not produce a treaty for initialling. The
documents reveal that the long months of consideration and accommodation given by both
bureaucracies to the drafts and counter-drafts were taking their toll, and feelings of
frustration, and eventually suspicion, seemed to grip the members of the two delegations.
Nonetheless, although the January negotiations were suspended, progress was made and
subsequent consultations gave hope that the third round of talks set down to commence on
4 March 1975 in Tokyo could reach a settlement on the few outstanding issues.22 This was
not the case. The files clearly show the Australian negotiators’ amazement when the Japanese
delegation suddenly introduced a new retroactive interpretation of the meaning of MFN
treatment at this round. The Australians had believed that an agreed interpretation on MFNMOREEN DEE   15
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status and its application had been settled. (Briefly, the Japanese now contended that the MFN
provision in the treaty text would give Japanese companies and investors the legal right to
establish themselves in Australia at that time under the same conditions as applied under old
Australian policies. Australia’s interpretation was that MFN commitments operated prospec-
tively and that Australia was only bound to offer those benefits being accorded at the time of
application.) The impasse was not broken and after eight consecutive days of discussions the
Australian delegation returned to Canberra.23 There were serious concerns for the direction
in which the treaty process appeared to be heading.
In summing up the situation, Michael Cook, the leader of the Australian delegation,
reported that Japan wanted to use the treaty to turn the principle of non-discrimination,
regarded by Australia as standard practice, into an international legal commitment. In other
words, Australia saw the treaty as ‘simply enshrining’ a ‘perfectly fair’ existing situation while
Japan wanted to use the treaty to change what it saw as an existing unfair situation in
Australia.24 The way forward obviously was to find appropriate wording within an interpre-
tation of MFN treatment that did not contain any implications for retroactivity and
prospectivity. But for next couple of months, as proposals and counter-proposals were
exchanged between Tokyo and Canberra, this did not appear to be possible.
Good news and bad news
The situation suddenly changed in late June, however, with a fortuitous informal meeting at
the Gaimusho between Ashton Calvert, First Secretary at the Australian embassy in Tokyo,
and Tadayuki Nonoyama, a key member of the Japanese negotiating team. Records of the
exchange show that these two officials argued until they clarified their countries’ position to
each other. They then set about devising an approach covering all expressions of MFN
treatment wherever applicable in the treaty.25 What was settled between Calvert and
Nonoyama this day, and followed up in a number of subsequent informal meetings, was
eventually accepted by both Tokyo and Canberra and, with some minor clarification,
essentially incorporated in the final treaty.
But this outcome was still some way off. The March talks had only served to deepen
both sides’ suspicions, in one way or another, of each other’s motives. In Canberra, this
situation fostered interdepartmental haggling over defining generalisations in the treaty
language and prevented the process moving forward in any sort of productive manner.26
When Cook was posted to London as Deputy High Commissioner in July, the task of
containing this state of affairs fell to his successor Garry Woodard, who would now bring a
much needed fresh outlook on the problems. Believing that the bureaucrats had ‘now become
too timid on the matter’ because of the length of time they had been working on it, he set16   THE NEGOTIATION OF THE 1976 BASIC TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION
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about putting the suspicion to rest and sorting out the legal problems that were dogging the
drafting process.27
It was not an easy task. While progress was made over the next few months, agreement
on a few key issues, particularly on the standard of treatment to be accorded nationals and
companies of each country resident in the other, still had not been reached when Malcolm
Fraser was elected Prime Minister in December 1975.
The final phase
It is clear in the files that Fraser immediately proved that he was equally as determined as
Whitlam had been to see the treaty concluded as soon as possible. He quickly overcame any
reservations held by his ministers and squashed an attempt by the new Treasurer, Philip
Lynch, to have the matter to be re-examined.28 But the months passed and a number of
intensive reviews and exchanges of revised texts between Canberra and Tokyo failed to resolve
all the outstanding issues—particularly Japan’s proposed rewording to upgrade treatment
accorded under the mandatory articles of the treaty on entry and stay matters and the conduct
of business and professional matters.29 An exasperated Fraser stepped in and ordered the
departments to get over their bureaucratic quibbling and ‘legalistic nit-picking’ and finish the
job. Declaring that ‘negotiating at arm’s length … was an odd way of doing business’, and
with Prime Minister Takeo Miki’s full support, he directed that ‘all future negotiations had
to be face to face’.30 With the wishes of their respective prime ministers abundantly clear, both
sides came to the table in early May 1976 with the intention of reaching agreement and,
indeed, after some hard bargaining all outstanding issues of substance were settled.31 After
two and a half years of negotiations, a treaty would now be ready for signature during Fraser’s
official visit to Japan the following month. It comprised a Preamble and 14 articles with a
protocol, two exchanges of notes and agreed minutes attached. (There is also an attached
record of discussion but this document is not part of the agreement.)32 The instruments of
ratification were exchanged in Canberra on 22 July 1977 and the treaty entered into force on
21 August 1977.
Summary
The Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Australia and Japan is the only one
its kind that Australia has concluded with any country. Its negotiation was a political imperative
of the Australian and Japanese prime ministers at the time. They recognised that Australia–
Japan relations were at an important stage in their development. On Australia’s part, the
government accepted that, given the special significance of formal treaty undertakings toMOREEN DEE   17
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Japan, it was in Australia’s interests to have an umbrella treaty that recognised the special
nature of both countries’ economic interdependence and under which this relationship could
be broadened and deepened.
For Japan, a bilateral treaty, similar to the traditional treaties of commerce and
navigation, was an essential progression in the development of its economic partnership with
another country. But the Japanese, too, recognised that the Australia–Japan relationship was
developing on more than economic lines and the Basic Treaty is broader in scope and
purposes than any of Japan’s many other treaties.
All the goodwill and mutual interests in the world, nonetheless, does not always arrive
at the desired outcome. The negotiation of the treaty was a long and often difficult process
and for both negotiating teams, it was a learning process to resolve the unique set of problems
that confronted them. To some extent, the members of the Australian team were feeling their
way, particularly in the early stages, as they negotiated Australia’s first treaty of this kind. For
their part, Japanese team members, despite Japan’s great experience of FCN treaty-making,
were faced with new elements in a treaty more comprehensive than any negotiated before.
But throughout, both sides remained committed and genuinely worked to establish a
set of guiding principles that would have lasting relevance. Fraser later paid tribute to what
he called ‘the strong spirit of mutual accommodation’ without which the treaty would not have
been possible, and he paid special tribute in Parliament ‘to the officials of both countries who
have helped the governments of both countries’ who managed to bring the treaty to a
successful conclusion.33
Thirty years on, questions surrounding the treaty’s possible invocation are largely
irrelevant. The real value of the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation is that it is the
symbolic demonstration of the commitment of both the Australian and Japanese Govern-
ments to the bilateral relationship and it underpins continued efforts to strengthen this
relationship further in the years ahead.
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3  REFLECTIONS ON AUSTRALIA–JAPAN ECONOMIC
RELATIONS AND AUSTRALIA’S APPROACH TO THE BASIC
TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION
MAX SUICH*
The papers by Geoff Miller and David Walton and Peter Drysdale, and the equally interesting
monograph by Moreen Dee on the Nara Treaty negotiation, provoke a few thoughts to an
outsider to the academic and bureaucratic process, that might be worth raising as talking
points.
First, it is interesting that in all the government-to-government activities and documents
cited today and in the book, there is little acknowledgement of the remarkable nature of the
business and personal relationships that arose with the new Australia Japan resources
relationship between 1965 and 1976. It is as if the officials and politicians did not really grasp
what was going on in the relationship—and that was, I think, the case
Those relationships arose from quite remarkable events. Against the odds, and in less
than 10 years, an unprecedented trade with Japan in coal and iron ore and bauxite and alumina
was established in the 1960s. This trade changed the way we thought about our economy and
ourselves, and changed equally dramatically our external relations. It was the basis for the
economic confidence that led to the 1983 reforms undertaken by the Hawke Government.
This trade is still having a major impact. It involved very high levels of financial and
engineering risk. Confronting that risk forged close human and business relationship—strong
enough and resilient enough to withstand political and economic shocks, even though some
of those shocks were dealt by our own governments and their bureaucracies.
The miners and the steel mills had to persuade international banks to provide non-
recourse finance for mines, railways and port works based on the expected cash flow and on
the underlying assurance of the contracts from the Japanese steel mills. This was achieved
despite the conviction of most international banks that Japanese contracts, because of the
distinct difference of the Japanese legal system, were not enforceable in law—as to some extent
proved to be the case in the major downturn that followed 1974.
This intimate, cooperative and interdependent relationship was always the sinews of the
Australia–Japan economic relationship, but surprisingly it was often poorly understood by
both sides in government-to-government negotiations. Both sides saw their role as pursuingMAX SUICH   21
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narrow national self-interest, whereas the resource relationship—because of its interdependence,
imposed tolerance and cooperation, and more than a small measure of cultural understanding.
There were big differences between the Australian and Japanese sides, not least over
contract prices, equity relationships, and the encouragement by the Japanese of new mines
before the established mines felt they had made the profits they deserved. Race, pride, and
envy intruded on both sides. This cooperative environment was not often reflected at the
bureaucratic level as Moreen Dee’s monograph on the treaty negotiations and the joint paper
by Geoff Miller and David Walton indicates. My observations at the time also confirm this.
The bureaucratic and political negotiators did not appear to accept that the Japanese
buyers and Australian sellers saw the necessary trade-offs to get these projects off the ground
as fundamentally fair and just. For many years, Australian politicians and officials saw the
deals—and particularly the prices achieved—as unfair and an issue to be exploited. And this
unjustified rancour—rarely reflected in trade issues with the United States and the UK—
persisted.
Why could business come to agreement so much more rapidly and effectively than
government? The main reason is that both sides shared a common objective, which is always
more than helpful. That common objective was profit, which gave business negotiations an
underlying logic that the diplomatic and political negotiations lacked. I recall that this caused
some concern in Japanese official and political circles.
In my time as a correspondent in Japan from 1967–71 covering these developments,
it was fashionable for Japanese commentators, conservative and left-wing, to lament a sort
of lost innocence: the Japanese, they said, had become ‘economic animals’. That is, the post-
war Japan lacked the old Japanese virtues of thrift and self discipline, contempt for material
goods and fighting spirit.
In fact, many in Japanese industry felt pride in nation building by building the economy.
And they met their exact counterpart in Australia. We too were nation building, in other
words, we too were ‘economic animals’. Call it the ‘hip-pocket nerve’, greed, pragmatism
or native enterprise, but much can be achieved with Australia if you open markets for us and
deliver economic growth. We have another example in front of us in China today.
Why did governments get involved in such pointless and sometimes damaging arm-
twisting of the kind Moreen Dee, Geoff Miller and David Walton outline? It is worth noting
that the various government agencies on both sides were frequently representing the lobbies
and political interests of their political masters. In the period preceding the start of the Nara
Treaty negotiations, and in the 1980s when markets for Australian manufactures became a
major issue between Japan and Australia, the influence of key political lobby groups in both
countries had much more to do with the issue than the interests of the resource relationship—
which was the foundation of our new trade relationship.22   REFLECTIONS ON AUSTRALIA–JAPAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
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It is curious how it prospered best in the shadows. In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
the Department of Trade acted often as an arm of John McEwen and Doug Anthony—as
a representative of the agricultural support base of the Country Party and of the manufacturing
industry that McEwen had built up as the significant financier of the Country Party. I
sometimes watched with amazement in Tokyo as manufacturing took all the attention of the
Trade Office of the Australian Embassy to the exclusion of minerals. I wrote that in my articles
on occasion and was rebuked by Russell Madigan, then head of Hamersley Iron. He wanted
to be spared Doug Anthony—assistance, and he certainly did not want the help of Rex
Connor, when he became the Minister for Resources and Energy in the Whitlam Government
in 1972—and in hindsight he was right on that.
In the 1980s the concern of the Hawke Labor Government with finding manufacturing
markets in Japan arose from the influence of the labour movement and its despair at the
collapse of the Victorian manufacturing industry—and from internal coal industry quarrels
where NSW saw its underground pits being outflanked by the more efficient mines of the
Bowen Basin in Queensland.
In the case of the Nara Treaty, the diplomats and the bureaucrats of both sides were
often fighting the last war rather than negotiating the new peace. Fear of and distaste for
coloured races and of Japan in particular remained a major issue within the Australian
bureaucracy and politicians well into the late 1970s. Usefully, you can detect this in Moreen
Dee’s monograph, though the official euphemisms sought to obscure it.
The Australian difficulty with providing ‘most favoured nation’ (or MFN) treatment for
the ‘entry and stay’ of Japanese nationals is an example. Our defence of British Commonwealth
preferences, not just in trade and investment but in government staff recruitment and
immigration incentives, had more than a residual element of the White Australia policy
underlying it. Many in the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Immigration believed well in
to the 1980s that there was a possibility of large-scale and undesirable Japanese immigration.
It is hard to believe now that as late as 1990 Andrew Peacock was using the Multi-
Function Polis to raise fears of Japanese immigration and a Japanese ‘enclave’ in Adelaide as
an election campaign ploy. We would call that a ‘dog whistle issue’ today.
There were perverse strains in the Japanese approach too. Of course there was the
genuine irritation that arose from the difficulties legitimate Japanese suffered in obtaining
entry visas to Australia. But in the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Finance Ministry and Ministry
of International Trade and Industry (MITI), there was also a desire to punish us for the White
Australia Policy of the previous 70 years, while also and paradoxically wanting the status of
’honorary whites’ that they enjoyed under Apartheid in South Africa—to underline their racial
superiority and give Japan equivalence with the UK.MAX SUICH   23
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Some Japanese officials were frank enough to disclose their feelings of irritation and
envy with the Lucky Country. They felt that it was terribly unfair Australia had all these
valuable resources, when we were too stupid and shiftless to make sensible use of them by
building our own industries to make steel, aluminium and otherwise use our energy riches—
though Japan sought to prevent the establishment of those industries in Australia, largely
successfully.
A couple of other points:
As Moreen Dee makes clear the rival bureaucracies of Australia and Japan laboured long and
hard on the Nara Treaty and we learn of the frustrations of the Australian side and the close
encounters with failure that occurred. I would like to read a similar book arising from access
to the Japanese archives – perhaps a scholar from this school might consider such a work.
Moreen Dee’s monograph leads inevitably to the desire to examine the original source
documents she footnotes in her book. It is intriguing to think about the language used
internally to describe the underlying themes of race and fear that persisted in the 1970s.
Perhaps the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade might consider, when next an issue
is deemed worth a book, that a cooperative arrangement might be made with the archives
to digitise the relevant source documents so they can be referred to from outside Canberra.
China
The experience of those days raises some useful issues to consider for our new relationship
with China. This time it is the iron ore miners who appear to be the cartel. Our biggest miners
– BHP, RTZ and Xstrata – can hardly be called Australian companies any more. But our
politicians and officials could easily persuade themselves to feel the national interest was
involved in protecting them.
Eventually we are likely to see far more coordinated negotiating emerge from the
Chinese mills. And then we will hear new concerns about how new mines are being
encouraged to cause wasteful competition before old mines make their fair profits. If the
Chinese succeed we will hear demands for Government intervention to make the trade ‘fair’.
The Chinese are already looking for ‘fair’ trade to redress their negotiation weakness. It will
be interesting to see whether there is any better grasp of our resources relationships in the
negotiations for the free trade treaty with China, if it gets to the next step.
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